Adverse selection

Business basics1min read

Adverse selection occurs when one side of a transaction knows more about its risk or quality than the other, causing higher-risk or lower-quality participants to be more likely to take the deal.

How it works

The information gap exists before the transaction. A price based on average risk can look expensive to safer customers and attractive to riskier ones. If safer customers leave, the remaining pool becomes costlier. Insurance and lending are common examples.

Why a $550 premium can lose money

For an illustrative one-year life insurance policy paying $100,000 on death, consider two groups. Ignore expenses and profit.

GroupBuyersAnnual death probabilityExpected annual claims per buyer
Lower risk500.1%$100
Higher risk501%$1,000

The average expected claim is:

(50 × $100 + 50 × $1,000) ÷ 100 = $550 per policy

If all lower-risk buyers reject that premium and higher-risk buyers stay, expected claims rise to $1,000 per policy. Keeping the $550 premium produces an expected loss of $1,000 − $550 = $450 per policy.

The problem is not just high risk: the offer has attracted a worse risk mix.

What this means for a startup

Investors face a similar information gap when they cannot verify business quality. Strong startups can receive weaker offers if investors cannot distinguish them from weaker companies. Verifiable revenue and customer references help reduce that gap.

Questions people ask

What is adverse selection vs moral hazard?

Adverse selection concerns hidden risk or quality before a deal. Moral hazard concerns behavior affected by the deal: for example, a borrower takes bigger risks after receiving a loan because the lender bears part of the loss.

Related terms

Sources

  1. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, George A. Akerlof, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," August 1970.
  2. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," November 1976.